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FREDRIC C. MENZ*

Transborder Emissions Trading
between Canada and the

United States
ABSTRACT
Despite the fact that legislation to control acid rain is now in
place in both Canada and the United States, it would still be in both
countries' best interests to deal explicitly with transboundaryflows
of sulfur dioxide. Dealing directly with transboundaryacid rain as
a reciprocal externality suggests a commitment to binational
management that does not currently exist and allows for more
cost-effective pollution control by encouraging abatement at
lower--cost sources irrespective of national borders. A transborder
emissions tradingprogramfor northeasternNorth America, an area
encompassingeastern Ontario,southwestern Quebec, northernNew
York, and northern New England, is proposed. A binational
pollution control program for this region could be administered by
an authoritysuch as the bilateralAir QualityCommittee established
by the 1991 Canada-UnitedStates Air Quality Agreement.
INTRODUCTION
Canada and the United States have both implemented regulations
to reduce emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides, the primary precursors
of acid rain. The enabling United States legislation, the Clean Air Act
amendments of 1990, has the goal of reducing United States sulfur
dioxide (SO 2) emissions by ten million tons (about 50 percent of their
1980 levels) by the year 2000.' In 1985, the Canadian federal government
and eastern provinces agreed to reduce their SO z emissions to 50 percent
of their allowable 1980 level by 1994.2 Recently, Canada and the United
States also implemented regulations that would achieve equivalent
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1. U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1990).
2. Federal/Provincial Research and Monitoring Coordinating Committee, The 1990
Canadian Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants and Acid Deposition Assessment Report,
Part 1, Executive Summary 3 (1990) thereinafter RMCC].
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reductions in nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions? Thus, acid rain control
regulations in the two countries are now effectively harmonized.
Despite the fact that legislation has been enacted in both Canada
and the United States to deal with acid rain, it would be in both
countries' best interests to deal explicitly with the problem of transboundary acidic deposition. There are significant cross-border flows of
SO2 in northeastern North America, so acidic deposition in this region is
best viewed as a binational problem rather than a problem confined
within a single country's borders.
Treating acid rain as a regional transboundary issue-a reciprocal
externality-should reduce the costs of controlling acidic deposition by
encouraging pollution abatement at lower-cost sources irrespective of
national borders. A transboundary approach to acid rain control could be
implemented by expanding the existing S0 2 emissions trading program
in the United States to include Canadian sources and adopting a similar
emissions trading plan in Canada. A transborder emissions trading
program could be administered either by the bilateral Air Quality
Committee established by the 1991 Canada-United States Air Quality
Agreement or by the Commission on Environmental Cooperation created
in conjunction with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The first section of this paper provides an overview of Canadian
and United States acid rain control policies, followed by a discussion of
why a bilateral effort to control transboundary acidic deposition is
warranted. The rationale for using market-based policies for environmental protection is then presented. The following section discusses
existing environmental agreements between Canada and the United States
and suggests how they might be modified to deal more effectively with
transboundary acid rain. The final section presents a proposal to include
individual sources on both sides of the border in northeastern North
America in a transborder SO emissions trading program.
Acid Rain Control Policies in Canada and the United States
Until the mid-1980s, air quality regulations in both Canada and
the United States were concerned primarily with local air quality, with
emphasis on achieving target rates of emissions from individual sources
rather than total emission loadings into the atmosphere.4 In both

3. Air Quality Committee, United States-Canada Air Quality Agreement, 1994 Progress
Report, EPA/430/R-94/013, 1 (1994).
4. For a discussion of U.S. air pollution policy prior to 1990, see Paul R. Portney, Air
Pollution Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 27-96 (Paul R. Portney ed.,
1990). Canadian environmental policies are discussed in Getting It Green: Case Studies in
Canadian Environmental Regulation (G. Bruce Doern ed., 1990).
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countries, air pollution regulations have historically dealt primarily with
single pollutants in local environments and have largely ignored
pollution problems associated with the long range atmospheric transport
of pollutants.' Interest in regional air pollution problems, particularly
acid rain, followed the discovery of acidic surface waters and declining
fish populations in water bodies in northern Ontario and the Adirondack
Mountain region of northern New York during the mid-1970s.
In 1985, the Canadian federal government and the seven provinces from
Manitoba eastward ratified an agreement to reduce SO 2 emissions to
one-half of their allowable 1980 level by 1994.6 A permanent national cap
was set for SO, emissions at 3.2 million tonnes (metric tons) to take effect
beginning in the year 2000.' The objective of Canada's acid rain abatement effort is to protect all but the most sensitive aquatic ecosystems by
limiting wet sulfate deposition to 20 kilograms per hectare per year.
Following this agreement, Ontario developed a comprehensive set of
regulations calling for the elimination of 1.31 million tonnes of SO 2
emissions in Ontario by 1994 and establishing maximum annual
emissions for each of four major corporate sources! The other eastern
Canadian provinces introduced similar regulations or otherwise agreed
to comply with the 1985 federal-provincial agreement.9 In some cases,
federal or provincial governments have provided financial assistance to
industrial sources to reduce their emissions.
In the United States, the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA) directly addressed the problem of acid rain, calling for an
approximate 50 percent reduction in SO 2 emissions from their existing
levels by the year 2000 and a permanent cap of 8.95 million tons of SO 2
emissions per year for electric utilities and 5.6 million tons on industrial
sources by the year 2010.10 The 1990 CAAA established new emission
caps for individual electricity-generating units in two phases. In Phase I,
263 units at the 110 largest electric utilities in 21 midwestern and eastern

5. The problem of acid rain occurred in part because of the focus of controlling local
pollution from existing sources. For further discussion, see Portney, supra note 4, at 37-40,
and Lester B. Lave & Gilbert S. Omenn, Clearing the Air: Reforming the Clean Air Act 43-44
(1981).
6. RMCC, supra note 2, at 3.
7. Air Quality Committee, supra note 3, at 7.
8. Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Countdown Acid Rain, Summary and Analysis
of the Second Progress Reports by Ontario's Four Major Emission Sources of Sulfur Dioxide
(1987).
9. Provincial acid rain regulations are discussed in House of Commons Special Comm.
on Acid Rain, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Committee on Acid Rain,
First Report, Issue 24 (1988) and RMCC, Part 2, Emissions and Controls (1990).
10. U.S. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (1990); Air Quality Committee, supra note 3, at
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states were required to meet new emission caps beginning in 1995.11 The
second phase tightens annual emissions limits in the year 2000 on the
existing utility
same sources and establishes emission caps for all other
12
units with an output capacity of at least 25 megawatts.
The centerpiece of the acid rain control program is an emissions
allowance trading program to control sulfur dioxide emissions from
electric utilities. Sources will be allowed to meet the new emissions
standards either by reducing their emissions or by using emission
"allowances" that permit the holder to emit one ton of SO 2 during or after
a specified year. 3 Beginning in 1995, enough allowances will be
allocated each year by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
meet the emissions targets of the CAAA. The bulk of the allowances will
be allotted on an annual basis to individual sources based on their
historic fuel consumption and an emissions rate specified in the
legislation.14 In addition to the annual allocations, allowances are also
available to sources that install a particular SO 2 abatement technology or
curtail emissions beyond the mandated level through energy conservation
measures."s About three percent of the total annual allowances will be
allocated through special auctions and direct sales conducted by the
EPA. 16
Once the SO 2 emission allowances have been allocated, they are
fully marketable and can be sold or traded to other parties or banked for
possible future use. 7 Allowances can be held by any individual,
corporation, or governing body, including brokers, municipalities, utility
power pools, environmental groups, or private citizens anywhere in the
contiguous United States. 8 To insure compliance, affected electric
utilities must continuously monitor their SO2 emissions and conduct an
end-of-year audit to determine whether they have sufficient allowances
to match their emissions. If they do not hold enough allowances, they
must obtain additional ones either through internal transfers or by
acquiring them from other sources." Sources who fail to hold a sufficient number of allowances to cover their emissions are subject to a

11. U.S. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651c (1990).
12. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain Program Allowance
System, EPA 430/F-92/018, at 1 (Dec. 1992).
13. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain Program Allowance
System, EPA 430/F-92/018, at 2 (Dec. 1992).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain Program Allowance Auctions and
Direct Sales 1 (1980).
17. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 13, at 2.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2, 3.
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penalty of $2,000 (adjusted annually for inflation) per ton of excess
emissions and must forfeit an equivalent amount of the following year's
allowances to offset their excess emissions."
The Need for Cooperationbetween Canada and the United States
The primary precursors of acidic deposition are emissions of
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from anthropogenic sources. These
pollutants can be transported in the atmosphere and deposited hundreds
of miles from their original source. Total emissions of S02 in the two
countries in 1985 were 24.7 million tonnes; total NOx emissions in 1985
were 20.5 million tonnes." Stationary sources account for the bulk of
SO 2 emissions in both countries and more than 80 percent come from
eastern North America, defined as the states east of the Mississippi River
and the provinces east of Saskatchewan.' By contrast, the sources of
nitrogen oxides are much more widely dispersed and nearly one-half of
NOx emissions in the United States and Canada come from mobile
2
3

sources.

There are significant flows of SO 2 emissions across the CanadianUnited States border in both directions. In 1985, 3.2 million tonnes of
United States SO 2 emissions, representing more than 15 percent of the 21
million tonnes of SO2 emissions produced in the United States, ended up
in Canada. One million tonnes of Canada's SO 2 emissions, representing
about one-fourth of the 3.7 million tonnes emitted in Canada, ended up
in the United States. 4 Most of the cross-border flow of SO 2 occurs in
northeastern North America. Southeastern Canada (the provinces of
Ontario and Quebec) receives at least 50 percent of its sulfur deposition
from sources located in the United States.' Emissions of SO 2 from
Canada are estimated to cause about 25 percent of total acidic deposition

20. U.S. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651j (1990).
21. National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, Acidic Deposition: State of Science
and Technology: Summary Report of the U.S. National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Program 26 (1991).
22. Federal/Provincial Research and Monitoring Coordinating Committee (RMCC), The
1990 Canadian Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants and Acid Deposition Assessment
Report, Part 3, Atmospheric Sciences at 3-18, 3-19.
23. RMCC, supra note 22, at 3-20, 3-21.
24. Environment Canada, Canada-United States Acid Rain, Transboundary Flows of Acid
Rain Pollution, Canadian Embassy (Dec. 1988); National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Program, supra note 21, at 26.
25. National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, Acidic Deposition: State-of-Science
and Technology, Summary Compendium Document at SOS/T4-9 (Patricia M. Irving ed.,
1990); RMCC, supra note 22, at 101; National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, 1990
Integrated Assessment Report 184 (1991).
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in northern Maine and 15 percent of total deposition across the rest of
New England but less than five percent of total deposition elsewhere in
the United States.3
The transboundary flow of SO2 between Canada and the United
States has several important policy implications. One implication (well
understood in Canada) is that it would be difficult for Canada to solve
its acidic deposition problem without cooperation from the United States
because Canada "imports" nearly as much SO 2 from the United States as
it produces itself.' Thus, Canada vigorously lobbied for SO 2 emissions
to be significantly curtailed in the United States.' Another implication
is that cost-effective control of acidic deposition damages in northeastern
North America should involve binational sharing of emissions reductions
because the costs of controlling emissions are likely to vary among
sources irrespective of national borders. For example, acid rain damages
in a particular region in Canada might be less costly to control by
curtailing emissions from a nearby United States source than by forcing
a Canadian source to reduce its emissions. The final, perhaps most
important, implication is that with transboundary pollution neither the
polluters nor the nations where their emissions occur face the proper
incentives to institute efficient pollution abatement measures. Efficient
control of a transboundary externality requires some sort of bargaining
or negotiated solution between the affected parties to achieve the efficient
levels of activities that cause the externality.
Managing transboundary pollution is in principle no different
than managing a pollution problem confined within a nation's borders.
However, because the issue extends beyond a single country's jurisdiction, determining responsibility for transboundary pollution can be
problematic." The tendency is to adopt the "polluter pays principle"
which states that the responsibility for the costs of pollution control, if
not any remaining damages, rests with the source of pollution.' While
26. National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, supra note 25, at 184.
27. Government of Canada, The State of Canada's Environment 24-19 (1991).
28. See Acid Rain and Friendly Neighbors, The Policy Dispute between Canada and the
United States 146-148 (urgen Schmandt et al. eds., 1988).
29. Even within a nation, wide disparities in emissions and deposition in different
geographic areas can prevent remedial action if rights are unclear. In the debate over acid
rain in the United States during the 1980s, northeastern states took the position that states
in the midwest must cut emissions in order to control acidic deposition while midwestern
states argued that it was unfair for them to bear the burden of reducing acid rain damages
that might be occurring elsewhere. A similar conflict among regions occurred in Canada,
where the Atlantic provinces claimed that some of their acidic deposition resulted from
emissions in downwind provinces. On this point, see House of Commons Special Committee
on Acid Rain, supra note 9 at, 13-14.
30. For a discussion of the issue of state responsibility for transboundary pollution, see
Ralph C. D'Arge and Allen V. Kneese, State Liability for Environmental Degradation: An
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many pollution problems could conceivably be settled with private
actions, acidic deposition is an exception since there are large numbers
of emitters and victims on both sides of the border and it is impossible
for the victims and polluters to identify each other. In such cases,
governments must act on behalf of their citizens to resolve the problem.3 In the case of transboundary acid rain, effective management on
a binational basis would require agreement between Canada and the
United States on both the magnitude of the cross-border flow of
pollutants and the fundamental principles of extraterritorial responsibility.
Market-based Mechanisms for ControllingAcid Rain
Both Canada and the United States have traditionally relied on
source-specific direct regulations to achieve their environmental goals.
Most United States environmental protection policies give sources little
flexibility in the means that can be used to comply with emission
standards.' The Canadian approach to controlling pollution also
employs direct regulations, but there is a greater tendency to use
negotiation and exhortation with individual sources as a substitute for
strict legal enforcement of emission standards.'
In both countries,
however, there is increasing interest in the use of economic instruments
such as effluent charges and tradable emission entitlements to achieve
pollution control goals. Market-based policies can achieve the same level
of environmental protection at less cost than direct regulations by
changing the incentives that individual emitters face.3
There has been little direct experience with market incentive programs for environmental protection in Canada, but federal and provincial
authorities are currently examining design and implementation issues
associated with their use. The Green Plan committed the Canadian federal
government to study the feasibility of utilizing economic incentives in
environmental protection, and the possibility of using marketable permits
for controlling S02 emissions in Canada and allowing emissions trading

Economic Perspective,20 Nat. Resources J.427 (1980).
31. Anthony Scott, The Canadian-American Problem of Acid Rain, 26 Nat. Resources J. 337
(1986).

32. For a discussion of U.S. environmental protection policies, see Paul Portney, Public
Policies for Environmental Protection (Paul Portney ed., 1990).
33. For a discussion of Canadian environmental protection policies, see Getting it Green:

Case Studies in Canadian Environmental Regulation, supra note 4.
34. The current use of economic instruments for environmental protection in different
countries is surveyed in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,

Managing the Environment: The Role of Economic Instruments (1994).
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between Canadian and United States sources has also been raised.'
There is no formal emissions trading program in Canada, but the
province of Ontario allows Ontario Hydro to "trade" emissions among its
electricity generating stations.' It is known that the marginal costs of
controlling sulfur dioxide varies greatly among the major sources in
Ontario, so allowing them to trade pollution abatement responsibilities
could generate considerable savings in pollution control costs.37 Prior to
the SO2 emissions trading program in the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, the only United States environmental policies that involved
"emissions trading" were the air pollution offset, netting, and banking
programs, an emissions trading program for phasing out lead in motor
fuels, and one or two instances of transferable discharge permits for
water pollution control.'
The primary advantage of market incentives such as tradable
emissions allowances and effluent charges is that their use can lower the
costs of meeting an environmental quality standard by allocating
pollution abatement responsibility among sources in a cost-effective
manner." The total cost of achieving a given reduction in emissions will
be minimized when pollution abatement responsibilities are allocated
among sources such that the marginal cost of the last unit of abatement
is the same for all sources. Effluent charges and tradable emission
entitlements tend to achieve this result automatically. In addition, and
perhaps most importantly, economic instruments provide a continuing
incentive for sources to develop and employ new methods of controlling
pollution because a value is placed on reducing any discharges remaining.4
With an emissions trading program, enough allowances are
issued by the environmental authority to meet the desired level of
aggregate emissions. Sources can either purchase an allowance or reduce
their emissions in order to comply with their emissions standard. Any
35. Government Canada, Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection 30 (1992).
36. Ontario Ministry of the Env't and Ministry of Energy, A Review of Ontario Hydro's
Acid Gas Report (1989).
37. Donald H. Dewees, The Regulation of Sulfur Dioxide in Ontario, in Getting it Green:
Cases Studies in Canadian Environmental Regulation, supra note 4, at 129-154.
38. Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptionsfor Environmental Problems: How the Patient
Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J. Econ. Perspectives 954 (1989); Thomas H. Tietenberg,
Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, 6 Oxford Rev. Econ. Policy 17 (1990).
39. For the formal demonstration of this proposition, see William J. Baumol & Wallace
E. Oates, The Theory of Economic Policy (2d 1988); W. David Montgomery, Markets in
Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs,5 J. Econ. Theory 395 (1972).
40. David A. Malueg, Emission Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Control
Technology, 17 J. Env't. Econ. Mgmt. 52 (1989); Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm
Incentives to Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. Env't. Econ. Mgmt. 247
(1989).

Fall 19951

TRANSBORDER EMISSIONS TRADING

emissions by a source beyond those permitted by the allowances it holds
are subject to a steep monetary fine. Sources with abatement costs that
are higher than the price of an allowance have an incentive to purchase
allowances, whereas firms with relatively low abatement costs will tend
to decrease their emissions and sell "excess" allowances. Trading
emissions allowances among sources enables marginal abatement costs
for different sources to be equalized, so the market equilibrium is the
cost-effective allocation of pollution control responsibility.
Effluent charges levied on a source for each unit of its emissions
can also achieve cost-effective pollution abatement. Under an effluent
charge system, the charge is set at whatever level is necessary to achieve
the target reduction in emissions. Sources have the option of either
reducing their emissions to avoid the charge or continuing to emit and
paying the charge. Emitters have an incentive to find cost-effective
abatement techniques and will choose levels of control that are consistent
with equal marginal abatement costs because they all face the same
charge. In this way, a per-unit charge levied on effluent
41 discharges
automatically results in cost-effective pollution abatement.
Differences in pollution abatement costs provide the basis for
potential cost savings with the use of market-based incentives for
pollution control. Sources of acid-gas emissions have a wide range of
characteristics resulting in many alternative options for controlling SO2
emissions, including fuel substitution, fuel cleaning, modifications of the
combustion process, and cleaning of flue gases.42 Sulfur dioxide
abatement costs for existing sources can vary widely even when the same
control technology is employed. For example, the cost of switching to
fuels with a lower sulfur content varies among emitters according to
characteristics of the fuel, furnace design, and the location of fuel supplies.43 The costs to retrofit pollution control devices like flue-gas
de-sulfurization units (scrubbers) depend upon characteristics of the

41. Effluent charges will achieve the target environmental standard only if the authority
sets the correct level of the charge or is willing to engage in a trial-and-error process to find
the correct level. Emissions trading does not face this problem because the authority directly
controls the quantity of emissions and the price of the permits is set by market forces.
Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. Econ. Lit.
675, 687 (1992).
42. For further discussion of abatement technologies, see National Acid Precipitation
Assessment Program, Acidic Deposition: State-of-Science and Technology, in Report 25,
Technologies and Other Measures for Controlling Emissions: Performance, Costs, and
Applicability, Revised Public Review Draft (1990); National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Program, supra note 21, at 217-27; and RMCC, supra note 9.
43. National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, supra note 21, at 217.
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existing equipment, flue-gas temperature, the type of sorbent, and costs
for disposing of the waste sulfate."
Recent studies provide estimates of costs for controlling emissions
from stationary sources of S0 2 in both the United States and Canada. For
new utility sources in the United States, average annualized costs to
achieve 90 percent SO 2 abatement range from about $275 to $500 (in 1988
dollars) per tonne of SO 2 removal, depending on the type of emission
control technology.45 Retrofitting pollution control technologies to
existing utility sources using existing methods of moderate difficulty
would cost from $560 to $700 per tonne of SO 2 removed, whereas controls
of similar effectiveness on new plants would cost $400 per ton of SO,
removed.* Costs for SO 2 removal in new industrial sources are estimated to be about $200 to $400 (in 1988 dollars) per tonne."7 For industrial
sources located in Ontario, the average cost for an additional 10 percent
cutback beyond the 1994 target varies from $270 to $1,400 (in 1987
Canadian. dollars) per tonne of S0 2 removed.'
These figures mask differences in marginal abatement costs
among individual sources because they represent average costs across
entire industries. In Ontario, abatement costs ranged from about $200 per
tonne for SO2 removal in smelters to about $1,500 per tonne for Ontario
Hydro and a multiple of that amount in smaller sources like pulp and
paper mills and oil refineries.' The United States Office of Technology
Assessment estimated that SO2 control costs in industrial processes
ranged from $300 per ton in coke ovens to over $3,000 per ton in "other
iron and steel" industries.5" The same study found that the average
per-ton cost of SO2 abatement across all sources in the pulp and paper
industry was $2,600, but varied among different plants from $450 to
$14,800 per ton of SO 2 abatement.5'
Given these differences in S02 abatement costs among emitters,
there are likely to be substantial cost savings if abatement responsibility
were allocated among the sources in a least-cost manner. This could be
achieved either through direct regulations tailored to individual sources

44. Id. at 217-27.

45. Id. at 220.
46. Id. at 219.
47. Id. at 222.
48. Jack A. Donnan & Arun Deshpande, Ontario Ministry of the Env't, Acid Precipitation
in Ontario Study: Control Strategies and Costs of Incremental SO, and NOx Emissions
Reductions in Ontario Beyond 1994 (1991).
49. Ontario Ministry of the Envt, Economic Incentive Policy Instruments to Implement
Pollution Control Objectives in Ontario (1991).
50. U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Acid Rain and Transported Pollutants,
Implications for Public Policy 187 (1984).
51. id. at 185.
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(which is the policy in the province of Ontario52) or through economic
incentive-based pollution control strategies such as emissions trading or
effluent charges. It has been estimated that the costs of meeting the acid
rain control provisions in the 1990 CAAA will be reduced by one-third
(from $6 or $7 billion annually to about $4 billion) by allowing emissions
trading and giving emitters greater flexibility in the choice of pollution
control methods.' Studies by the Ontario Ministry of the Environment
indicate potential cost savings of 25 to 30 percent if least-cost strategies
were used to apportion reductions of S02 emissions among major sources
in the province of Ontario.54
Extending emissions trading to include pollution sources on both
sides of the Canadian-United States border would result in further cost
savings. With a greater number of sources involved in emissions trading,
the costs of meeting the environmental standard will fall because there
will be more opportunities to transfer abatement responsibilities to
sources with lower abatement costs.' Enlarging the geographic scope of
emissions trading will also reduce the likelihood that firms holding
allowances will gain market power in either the emissions allowance
market or the output market. However, a drawback to a larger allowance
trading area is that the pattern of emissions trading can result in significant pockets of regional deposition, known as pollution "hot spots".'
This problem can be addressed by limiting the geographic scope of
trades, but this would reduce the cost-effectiveness of the emissions
trading program.
A concern in implementing an emissions trading program in
Canada is the thinness of the potential market for emissions allowances
because most of Canada's SO 2 emissions come from a small number of
sources.' In Manitoba, two companies (Inco Ltd. and Hudson Bay
Mining and Smelting) are responsible for 95 percent of that province's

52. Emission reductions are apportioned among major stationary sources in Ontario after
considering the marginal cost of abatement with the available technology, previous pollution
control measures taken by the source, and the economic environment for each of the
sources. Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Countdown Acid Rain: Government
Summary and Analysis of the Sixth and Final Planning Phase, Progress Reports Submitted
by Ontario's Three Major Emitters of Sulfur Dioxide in the Metallurgical Sector (1989).
53. Paul R. Portney, Economics and the Clean Air Act, 4 J.Econ. Persp. 173 (1990). See also
Air Quality Committee, supra note 3, at 45.
54. Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Acidic Precipitation in Ontario Study (APIOS),
Annual Program Report, 1988-1989 (1990). See also Donald H. Dewees, supra note 4.
55. For a discussion of how the size of the trading area affects the potential cost savings
from emissions trading, see Tietenberg, supra note 38, at 25.
56. Scott E. Atkinson & Thomas H. Tietenberg, Economic Implications of Emissions Trading
Rules for Local and Regional Pollutants, 20 Can. J. Econ. 370 (1987).
57. Canada, supra note 35, at 29.
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2 emissions; four companies (Algoma, Falconbridge, Inco Ltd., and
Ontario Hydro) contribute 80 percent of S0 2 emissions in Ontario; and in
Quebec, Noranda accounts for over half of provincial SO 2 emissions.'
Together, these six corporations account for approximately 50 percent of
total Canadian S0 2 emissions.' Enhancing the size of the Canadian
emissions allowance market by allowing trades with United States
sources would expand the opportunities for emissions transfers and allow
for a more competitive market than if transfers were limited to Canadian
sources alone.
An emissions trading program would also speed the adoption of
sulfur-removing technology, the development of alternative fuels, and
other pollution control innovations. Since transferable emissions
entitlements are a valuable commodity, suppliers will have an incentive
to help sources shift to environment-friendly processes in exchange for
a share of the unused S02 permits that are generated. Over time, as
environmental standards become more stringent and the supply of
available credits diminishes, the incentive to develop new abatement
technologies can be expected to be greater as well.

S0

Environmental Agreements between Canada and the United States
There have been numerous agreements between the United States
and Canada that address air and water pollution, but no formal treaties
concerning bilateral transboundary pollution have been ratified by the
two countries since the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. 0 The Boundary
Waters Treaty recognized the need for bilateral cooperation in managing
United States-Canadian boundary waters and established the principle
that neither country should use the boundary waters to the detriment of
the other.
Canada and the United States began formal discussions on the
issue of acid rain in 1978 when a bilateral research group was established
to study the long-range effects of air pollutants.61 In 1980 the two
countries signed a memorandum of understanding to develop a bilateral
agreement to address transboundary acidic deposition, but negotiations
broke down two years later when Canada pressed for an immediate
commitment to significantly reduce acid-gas emissions and the United
States said that more research was required to justify further controls. 2

58. Id. at 29.
59. Id.
60. Boundary Waters Treaty, January 11, 1909, US.-U.K., 36 Stat. 2448, 2550.
61. Canadian-U.S. negotiations and cooperative research efforts prior to 1988 are
discussed in Schmandt, Clarkson, and Roderick, supra note 28, at 64-106.
62. Id. at 85-92.
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In March 1991, after the United States amended its Clean Air Act, the two
countries signed the Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement. This
agreement formalized each country's commitment to meet their SO2 and
NOx emissions targets and obligated them to coordinate efforts to
monitor the effects of transboundary air pollution.' The agreement also
created a bilateral Air Quality Committee to assist in implementing the
agreement and to review progress towards achieving the accord's
objectives.
The two countries are also partners with Mexico in an environmental accord developed in conjunction with the North American Free
Trade Agreement." The environmental accord created a North American
environmental commission (the Commission for Environmental Cooperation) whose primary goal is to insure that each country's environmental
regulations are enforced but will also serve to increase coordination
among the three countries in environmental protection. The commission
will attempt to resolve environmental disputes involving member
countries (particularly those relating to a member country's failure to
enforce its environmental regulations) and also has a mandate to evaluate
any proposed projects that might cause cross-border environmental
problems."
A Proposalfor a Transborder Emissions Trading Program
The spatial and temporal relationships between sources and
receptors of acidic deposition in North America have been the focus of
an extensive scientific research effort in Canada and the United States."
The northeastern part of North America, an area encompassing southern
Ontario, northern New York, southwestern Quebec, and northern New
England, has been the focus of much of this research activity because of
the concentration of industrial activity, the relatively high levels of sulfate
deposition, and the sensitivity to acidic deposition damages because of
the characteristics of its soils and bedrock in the region. This geographic
area would be an appropriate region for a bilateral acid rain control effort
based on the following assumptions:

63. See Air Quality Committee, supra note 3, at 7.
64. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13,1993, U.S.-Can.Mex.
65. Id. at 11.
66. National Academy of Sciences, Acid Deposition: Atmospheric Processes in Eastern
North America (1983); National Add Precipitation Assessment Program, supra note 21, at
26-27; RMCC, supra note 2; Stephen E. Schwartz, Add Deposition: Unraveling a Regional
Phenomenon, 243 Science 753 (1989).
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Because of prevailing weather patterns, air pollutants tend to travel from the south and west to the
north and east to a greater degree than they flow in
the opposite direction.67
Sensitive regions of the northeastern United States
receive about 70 percent of their acidic deposition from
sources located within 500 kilometers.'
United States sources account for approximately 50
percent of total sulfur deposition in southeastern Canada.6
Sensitive regions of northeastern United States (including
New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine)
receive from 15 percent to 25 percent of total sulfur
emissions from Canadian sources. 0

An emissions cap unique to this geographic area could be
established based upon the region's overall sensitivity to acidic deposition. Enough sulfur dioxide allowances to meet the emissions standard
would be distributed initially to existing emitters based on their historical
emission patterns, thus effectively "grandfathering" emissions from
existing sources. Grandfathering insures that sources would be no worse
off than under the existing regulatory regime; alternatively, the emissions
allowances could be sold by an auction process, but this might pose a
significant financial burden on sources needing to purchase allowances.
The allowances or entitlements would be dated in annual terms and
could be used during or after, but not before, the specified year. New
sources would have to obtain allowances from others to cover their
emissions, possibly from other sources who undertake activities which
curtail emissions.
Sources within the prescribed region could engage in unrestricted
trading of emission allowances, but the trades would be monitored by a
binational authority to insure that each country's environmental
standards are maintained. The authority would record allowance transfers
that are used for compliance and confirm that a source's emissions do not
exceed the number of allowances it holds, thus providing a public means
of accountability. Organized exchanges for trading allowances would
lower transactions costs. Emissions trading would minimize the costs of

67. U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 50, at 73.
68. National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, Acidic Deposition: State-of-Science
and Technology, Summary Compendium Document SOS/T8-3 (1990) (hereinafter Acidic
Deposition).
69. Id. at SOS/T4-9; RMCC, Rider 1,3-101 (1990); National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Program, 1990 Integrated Assessment Report 184 (1991).
70. Acidic Deposition, supra,note 68, at SOS/T4-9; National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Program, 1990 Integrated Assessment Report 184 (1991).
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meeting the uniform environmental quality standard within this designated region.
The mechanism for establishing cost-effective binational management of transboundary acid rain is already in place with the 1991
Canada-United States Air Quality Accord, but the adoption of a
transborder emissions trading program would imply a commitment to
binational management of air quality that does not exist at the present
time. In the air quality agreement, the two countries reaffirmed Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which
provides that nations have the sovereign right to exploit their resources
but the responsibility to ensure that their activities do not cause damage
in areas beyond their jurisdiction.' However, the bilateral agreement
did not clearly define rights to shared resources nor did it give authority
to the Air Quality Committee to identify pollution goals beyond those
specified in the agreement or to propose alternate strategies for meeting
the accord's environmental objectives.
At minimum, the Air Quality Committee should be allowed to
review and/or approve transfers of pollution control responsibility
between Canadian and United States sources. The geographical scope of
trading could be determined by this joint panel taking into account the
additional cost savings from enhanced emissions trading and the need to
maintain the target environmental quality level at different locations
within the region. It could also change the quantity of annual allowances
such that the environmental quality target for the region is not undermined.
The transborder emissions trading program could also be
established under the auspices of the North American Commission on
Environmental Cooperation. In creating that commission, the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States stated that each nation
has the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies and the "responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction" .n The commission is allowed to develop recommendations
on a number of environmental matters including transboundary concerns,
the use of economic instruments for pollution control, and the provision
of access to a member nation's courts by persons in another country who
suffer damage or injury from pollution originating in its territory.
However, the commission has not been given the authority to develop its

71. U. N. Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Env., U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/4 (1972).
72. The NAFTA Supplemental Agreements, supra note 64,at 1.
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own policies to control transboundary pollution and it remains to be seen
whether any recommendations it makes regarding equal access to
national courts or managing specific types of transboundary pollution
will be accepted by the NAFMA member nations.
Whatever decision-making body is given responsibility for
managing the transboundary acid rain problem, a fundamental issue will
involve determining the rights and responsibilities of the two countries.
Allowing emissions trading across an international border implies the
loss of national sovereignty in the use of environmental resources. This
need not be an insurmountable difficulty in this instance, however,
because Canadian and United States regulations controlling acid-gas
emissions are now effectively harmonized. Nonetheless, the experience
of Canada and the United States in numerous transboundary disputes
suggests an inability to consistently agree on which principle of responsibility should apply to transboundary pollution problems. In some
instances, the two nations have accepted the principle of external
responsibility, while in others the principle of territorial sovereignty has
been adopted. For example, in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 they
agreed that neither country should use boundary waters so as to injure
the other country. This principle was confirmed in the Trail Smelter Case
in which an international tribunal held a Canadian smelter responsible
for sulfur dioxide emissions coming into the state of Washington.' On
the other hand, in border disputes involving marine fisheries and in the
case of acid rain (prior to the 1991 air quality accord), the positions of the
two countries have usually reflected the principle of absolute territorial
sovereignty. 74
CONCLUSIONS
Emissions of sulfur dioxide do not respect the international border
between Canada and the United States, particularly in .the region
encompassing southeastern Canada and northeastern United States. A
binational authority could control transboundary acid rain by setting an
emissions cap for this region based on its overall sensitivity to acidic
deposition. With an emissions trading program, a limited amount of
emissions allowances would be distributed annually to sources and the
allowances would be freely transferable within the prescribed region.
Transfers of pollution control responsibility between Canadian and
United States sources could be monitored to ensure that environmental
standards in each country were maintained.

73. 'See Ralph C. D'Arge and Allen V. Kneese, supra note 30 (quoting Trail Smelter).
74. Scott, supra note 31.
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The geographic scope of trading could be determined by a binational
authority considering the additional cost savings from enhanced
emissions trading and the need to meet environmental targets in receptor
areas. A zone system that allows bilateral trading of emissions within
limited geographic areas represents an appropriate first step for
effectively managing transboundary acidic deposition. By allowing
trading of emission rights among sources in the United States and
Canada, the costs of reducing acidic deposition damage could be reduced
without sacrificing environmental objectives. Enhancing emissions trading
to include sources on both sides of the border would increase the
potential for eliminating differences in marginal abatement costs and
thereby the opportunities for both countries to achieve their environmental objectives at minimum cost. By placing a value on pollution control,
an emissions allowance program also provides an incentive for sources
to develop new methods of controlling their emissions.
The importance of a supranational authority in the resolution of
transboundary acid rain cannot be underestimated. In addition to
collecting information about emissions, pollution deposition, and
damages, this supranational body must be given independent authority
to identify environmental targets. For binational management to be
effective, the governments of Canada and the United States must come
to agreement on the underlying structure of rights and responsibilities.
Unless there is an overseeing body with the authority to tax the polluting
country within a mutually accepted structure of rights and liabilities, it
will be difficult to take the necessary actions to effectively manage transboundary pollution.

